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Financial Market Failure as a Crisis
in the Rule of Law:
From Market Fundamentalism to a New
Keynesian Regulatory Model
Timothy A. Canova*
Against the background of a close presidential election campaign, the
U.S. government responded to the great financial crisis of 2008 with a great
financial bailout, a massive federal effort to prop up financial institutions
and the economy itself. The crisis in credit and financial markets was the
most serious since the collapse of the nation's banking system in March
1933. A seismic generational shift in values has led to our present crisis.
The generation that came of age during the Great Depression and World War
II, the so-called Greatest Generation, achieved its most important public pol-
icy objectives-converting the economy first to enormous wartime produc-
tion and then to peacetime rebuilding-in large part because of a financial
regulatory regime that kept competition within prescribed limits while allo-
cating credit and capital away from private, speculative activity and into
longer-term public investment in physical and social infrastructure.1
The microeconomic fixations of today's law and economics school have
replaced this comprehensive Keynesian model of financial regulation. The
economic model underlying today's failing regulatory regime is a neoclassi-
cal equilibrium model that is highly abstract and mathematical, often based
on unrealistic assumptions and ignorant of historical contexts and the many
complex dynamics and interdependencies of human behavior and market
psychology. 2 Largely uncontrolled and uncoordinated, the current regula-
tory approach does not serve the interests of the public, but rather the far
* Betty Hutton Williams Professor of International Economic Law and Associate Dean for
Academic Affairs, Chapman University School of Law. The author wishes to thank the editors
of the Harvard Law & Policy Review for their skill and diligence in the substantive edits of
this article. My thanks as well to Michael Bernstein, Kurt Eggert, James Galbraith, Kevin
Johnson, Patricia McCoy, Bill McLeod, Rachel Moran, Jamin Raskin, Samuel Thompson,
Roger Torneden, Mark Tushnet, and Steve Zamora for various discussions, insights and com-
ments, and general encouragement of this article. Any errors in analysis are solely those of the
author.
' Adam Smith, the grandfather of neoclassical economics, believed that the state should
invest in public works. DOUGLAS F. DOWD, THE TWISTED DREAM: CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT
IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1776 8 (1974); cf Press Release, American Society of Civil
Engineers, America's Crumbling Infrastructure Eroding Quality of Life (Mar. 9, 2005), http:II
www.asce.org/reportcard/2005/page.cfm?id= 108 (reporting that the United States must spend
$1.6 trillion by 2010 to prevent deterioration of public infrastructure).2 See David Colander, IS/LM Model and Diagram, in AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KEYNESIAN
ECONOMICS 259, 260-61 (Thomas Cate ed., 1997) (noting criticisms of this widely employed
economic model as simplistic and based on unrealistic assumptions).
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narrower interests of the regulated institutions that have captured the agen-
cies of government and the policy-making process.
This Essay seeks to analyze the most important institutional and regula-
tory factors that have contributed to the ongoing financial market failure and
offers a framework for designing a new approach to financial regulation that
would meet the demands of the present. Part I, "The Logic of the Keynesian
Regulatory Regime," describes the adoption in the United States of a "com-
mand-and-control" financial regulatory regime, beginning in the 1930s and
1940s. This regime was part of a larger model, which I refer to as an institu-
tional law and Keynesian economics model, that focused on macroeconomic
policy objectives and was designed to achieve full employment, more equi-
table distributions of wealth and income, and greater transparency and ac-
countability in the regulatory process.3
Part II, "The Demise of the Economics of Control," describes the shift
away from Keynesian economics and command-and-control regulation to-
ward privatization and deregulation, a dangerous devolution that picked up
tremendous momentum beginning in the 1970s. During this period, concern
for Keynesian objectives fell by the wayside. Part III, "The Introduction of
Risk-Based Capital Standards," focuses on one component of this trend: the
movement toward industry self-regulation. This Part argues that the dangers
of the deregulatory trend became more apparent as industry self-regulation
undermined the transparency of financial institutions and markets while en-
couraging the development of an unsustainable, bubble economy.
Part IV, "Agency Capture and Revolving Doors," argues that the re-
placement of an effective system of command-and-control regulation by in-
dustry self-regulation was a function of larger institutional flaws. This Part
analyzes the failures of regulation in an institutional landscape marked by
agency capture and privatized authority-failures that set the stage for the
current financial crisis.
Part V, "The Bastard Keynesianism of the Bailout," critiques the eco-
nomic rationale of the current bailout in the context of continuing market
failure due to past deregulatory reforms. The financial crisis of 2008 did not
put an end to the flawed institutional super-structure that had been taking
root over the preceding thirty years. Part V describes a profound failure in
the rule of law and argues that the privatized Federal Reserve System repre-
sents the primary institutional roadblock preventing effective financial regu-
lation, a proper balance of constitutional authority on monetary and fiscal
policy, and needed reforms in public finance.
In conclusion, Part VI, "A New Economics of Control," presents rec-
ommendations for reviving the model of institutional law and Keynesian
economics as the best alternative to prevent future financial crises. This Part
builds on the original Keynesian model, suggesting a more complete and
integrated economic approach to counter the flawed policies that set the
' JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND
MONEY (1936).
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stage for our current financial crisis. But this approach can be developed
and implemented only if mechanisms for regulation are well-coordinated
and safeguarded from a meddling and self-serving financial industry.
I. TAE LOGIC OF THE KEYNESIAN REGULATORY REGIME
Laissez-faire capitalism was the prevailing orthodoxy in both law and
economics from the time of the 1929 stock market crash until the banking
crisis of 1933. Financial markets were largely unregulated and un-
supervised, and it was not seen as the responsibility of government to stimu-
late economic activity, even in a recession. British economist John Maynard
Keynes turned this orthodoxy on its head in his 1936 book, The General
Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money.4 This Section is primarily con-
cemed with Keynes's proposals for financial regulation, but in order to fully
appreciate these proposals, it is important to understand the broader eco-
nomic and policy context in which they were crafted. Accommodation to its
broader context sets Keynes's approach apart from the narrowly conceived
financial regulations of the last thirty years.
Keynes's proposals rested on a recognition that the economy could be-
come stuck in a liquidity trap in which expectations of falling prices and
falling profits, or what he referred to as a "declining marginal efficiency of
capital," would choke off new investments no matter how low interest rates
fell. According to Keynesian theory, there were complex economic and psy-
chological factors that could lead to such a liquidity trap. A top-heavy dis-
tribution of income could drain purchasing power from those segments of
the population most likely to spend and maintain demand for goods and
services-in economic terms, those with a high marginal propensity to con-
sume. Economic growth would thereby become dangerously dependent on
the luxury spending of the wealthy few and on unsustainably high levels of
private investment. A reduction in aggregate demand resulting from a steep
and sudden fall in prices and wages would bring the economy to a new,
lower equilibrium. Monetary policy would be unable to pull the economy
out of the trap.5
To Keynes, the implications of his theory for macroeconomic policy
were clear: if private investment and consumption stalled, the only realistic
engine of economic growth would be government spending. In turn, a hy-
peractive fiscal policy would require a central bank willing to maintain low
interest rates for government borrowing and spending programs.6 Such a
policy mix would also require a regulatory system of centralized credit con-
trols to keep credit from flowing back into speculative bubbles and to bring
4Id.
5 Id. at 207-08.
6 Id. at 202-06 (arguing that the central bank should maintain low long-term interest rates
to facilitate an expansive government fiscal policy).
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about adjustments in the propensities to consume and invest.7 Keynes recog-
nized that such central controls would "involve a large extension of the
traditional functions of government."8 Although he never spelled out the
details of those controls in The General Theory, an earlier essay on the bank-
ing crisis of 1931 gives us a hint of the controls Keynes had in mind. 9
When addressing the banking crisis of 1931, Keynes observed that
much of the speculative rise in stock prices that led to the 1929 market crash
was fueled by an enormous increase in loans for stock purchases without any
minimum down payments. Existing stock served as collateral to borrow
money for further stock purchases. There was no federal authority at the
time to set margin requirements, leaving the Federal Reserve, the nation's
central bank, with only two choices: moral suasion to encourage the volun-
tary tempering of these lending practices, or general credit restrictions. The
Fed chose the latter, thereby raising interest rates and making the downturn
and crash inevitable.'0 Keynes recognized that subsequent financial events
were consequences of this failure in regulation and monetary policy: a
worldwide collapse in the price of real assets and a wave of foreclosures and
business failures that left banks with enormous portfolios of bad loans, all of
which led to a liquidity crisis, freezing up the credit system and preventing
banks from financing new projects and engaging in new lending."
Consequently, Keynes pointed out the need for strict minimum down
payment requirements for loans for housing, consumer, and corporate securi-
ties purchases:
Experience has led to the fixing of conventional percentages for
the 'margin' as being reasonably safe in all ordinary circum-
stances. The amount will, of course, vary in different cases within
wide limits. But for marketable assets a 'margin' of 20 per cent to
30 per cent is conventionally considered as adequate, and a 'mar-
gin' of as much as 50 percent as highly conservative. 2
Keynes viewed such margin requirements as important means to limit sys-
tematic risk and protect financial institutions from any downward change in
the money value of assets by limiting the amount of credit allocated to mar-
ginal borrowers.
7 Id. at 379.
81d.
9 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, The Consequences to the Banks of the Collapse of Money
Values (1931), in ESSAYS IN PERSUASION 168, 170-71 (1963).
l For more on this theory of the crash, see ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FED-
ERAL RESERVE: 1913-1951, at 248-49 (2003); FREDERICK LEWIS ALLEN, ONLY YESTERDAY
306 (1931). Milton Friedman and Anna Jacobson Schwartz concluded that the Fed "followed
a policy which was too easy to break the speculative boom, yet too tight to promote healthy
economic growth" in the year leading up to the 1929 crash. MILTON FRIEDMAN & ANNA
JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 1867-1960, at 291
(1963).
" KEYNES, supra note 9, at 171-73.
12 KEYNES, supra note 9.
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In 1944, in The Economics of Control: Principles of Welfare Econom-
ics, Abba Lerner, one of the leading Keynesian economists in the United
States, sought to provide a more detailed theoretical framework for market
regulation and public finance in accordance with Keynes's observations. Ac-
cording to Lerner, within a system of private enterprise and private owner-
ship, the government should achieve regulatory coordination by taking on
responsibility for controlling the allocation of resources among consump-
tion, investment, foreign trade, and government spending. 3 Lerner under-
stood that government at all levels imposed all kinds of regulations on a
wide range of industries, institutions, and private transactions. "Yet," he
wrote, "we may refer to the actual economy as 'uncontrolled' because all
these activities are partial and haphazard and are not organized as they
would be if it were a recognized responsibility of the government to control
the resources of society to see that they are utilized in the best possible
manner."14
Lerner likened the uncontrolled economy "to an automobile without a
driver but in which many passengers keep reaching over to the steering
wheel to give it a twist while complicated regulations prescribe the order and
degree to which they may turn the wheel so as to prevent them from fighting
each other about it."'" He contrasted this with a controlled economy, with
one driver and a clear purpose, which would be simpler and have many
fewer regulations than an uncontrolled economy.
Likewise, in the field of finance much regulation can be quite complex
and yet ineffective in managing risk for lenders and protecting borrowers. In
contrast, margin requirements are far simpler yet also more successful at
limiting systematic risk. With high margin requirements there is less need to
rely on complex capital adequacy and truth-in-lending regulations to protect
borrowers and ensure the safety and soundness of the banking system.
In addition to promoting a controlled, coordinated financial system,
Lerner argued that government regulation should be aimed at achieving at
least three primary policy objectives: maintaining full employment, dimin-
ishing the tremendous inequality of income and wealth, and putting an end
to the monopoly structures that contribute to exploitation and economic
waste. 16 These objectives of control are designed to reduce the factors that
" See ABBA LERNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: PRINCIPLES OF WELFARE ECONOMICS
3 (1947).
" Id. at 3. Government regulation, when uncoordinated and without control, can lead to
market failure. For instance, Bert Ely identified several regulatory causes of the savings and
loan crisis-the problem may be the wrong regulatory mix. See Bert Ely, Savings and Loan
Crisis, in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF EcONONCS (2d ed. 2007), available at http://www.
econlib.org/library/Enc/SavingsandLoanCrisis.html.
1' LERNER, supra note 13, at 4 (citing A.P. Lerner, The Economic Steering Wheel, 7 THE
UNIv. REvmw 257 (1941)).
16 LERNER, supra note 13, at 3. Lerner also emphasized that these objectives would prove
elusive if the regulated industries themselves were able to capture the regulatory agencies-in
essence to cartelize their industries under the veil of regulation. Id. at 43, 46 (criticizing carte-
lization through the New Deal's Agricultural Adjustment Act). Lerner's concern with monopo-
listic exploitation can be seen as anticipating the Public Choice School concern with agency
2009]
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Keynes diagnosed to be at the heart of depression and business cycles. For
instance, the promotion of full employment and the reduction of income ine-
quality would help maintain aggregate demand and thereby keep the econ-
omy from falling into recession and potential liquidity traps. 7
In 1934, Congress began to move toward the vision of financial regula-
tion that Keynes expressed and Lerner would later develop. In that year,
Congress delegated to the Federal Reserve Board of Governors the authority
to set margin requirements on security loans.' 8 For the next two decades,
these and other "selective credit controls" came to be seen as important
policy tools to supplement general monetary measures that regulate the total
supply of money and bank credit and the general level of interest rates. In
contrast to these general monetary measures, selective credit controls influ-
ence the allocation of credit, "at least to the point of decreasing the volume
of credit used for selected purposes without the necessity of decreasing the
total supply and raising the cost of credit for all purposes." 19 During this
period, the Fed was given authority to set margin requirements on consumer
credit and real estate credit in the form of minimum down payments and
maximum periods of repayment. 20 Consumer credit controls were instituted
capture. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971)
(describing how the political process allows relatively small groups to obtain favorable regula-
tion); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J. LAW & ECON. 211
(1976); Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1039 (1997). These ideas will be discussed more fully in Parts Il through VI, where I
observe that agency capture has become all too common in the U.S. political system, as special
interest groups through money, lobbying, and the lure of private sector employment (the so-
called "revolving door") have come to accumulate great influence over key congressional
committees and regulatory agencies to avoid genuine competition. See THEODORE Lowl, THE
END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979); MANCUR
OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
"7 Lerner claimed that the fundamental cause of the business cycle was the inadequacy of
demand because of the very unequal distribution of income. LERNER, supra note 13, at 296.
This was consistent with the view of other leading Keynesians. See, e.g., JOHN KENNETH
GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 182 (1961) (arguing that the Great Depression and 1929 stock
market crash were due in part to a highly unequal distribution of income that made the econ-
omy "dependent on a high level of investment or a high level of consumer spending or both").
" LESTER V. CHANDLER, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY AND BANKING 248-49 (5th ed.
1969). Hearings by the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency beginning in 1931 and
spearheaded by Ferdinand Pecora, special counsel for the committee, revealed the dangers of
buying stocks on margin, and led to stricter margin requirements under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934. See generally BROADUS MITCHELL, DEPRESSION DECADE: FROM NEW
ERA THROUGH NEW DEAL 1929-1941 154-59 (1947).
19 CHANDLER, supra note 18, at 247. Margin requirements were just one tool in the arse-
nal of selective credit controls. During the 1960s and into the 1970s, the federal government
also employed selective controls including, but not limited to, differential taxes, lending quo-
tas, and ceilings on foreign investments to restrain credit to foreign borrowers. For a descrip-
tion of these selective controls, see Donald R. Hodgman, Selective Credit Controls, 4 J.
MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 342, 342-44 (1972).
20 For instance, demand for credit for particular purchases could be reduced by raising
minimum down payment requirements, which would lower the maximum loan value, or by
shortening the maximum period of repayment, which would increase monthly payments on
loans. See CHANDLER, supra note 18, at 250.
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in late 1941 and remained in effect almost continuously until 1952.21 Credit
controls for new residential construction were used from 1950 to 1952 as
part of an anti-inflation program during the Korean War.22 Together, these
controls diverted financial resources from nonessential uses and assisted the
government in meeting its wartime funding requirements by keeping interest
rates low on government debt.23
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, economists and policymakers saw
margin requirements as an effective way to prevent bubbles in real estate
and other sectors without raising interest rates for the entire economy and
without raising borrowing costs for all levels of government. Ervin Miller, a
University of Pennsylvania economist writing in the 1950s, argued that se-
lective credit controls were more precise than general credit restrictions and
therefore "very useful in periods of uncertainty when some areas of the
economy show undue expansion" and other sectors are weak. 24 Throughout
this period of time, even Fed officials who opposed the use of selective
credit controls on ideological grounds wanted such policy tools at their dis-
posal in case emergency conditions might suddenly arise.25
These policymakers, like Keynes and Lerner, recognized that when the
central bank uses one blunt instrument-the short-term interest rate-it is
abandoning the steering wheel for the stop-and-go of an accelerator. When
the central bank seeks to contain speculative bubbles in stocks or housing
through general monetary measures alone, the results can be destabilizing.
Lowering interest rates for all may invite speculative bubbles in already
heated sectors of the economy. Raising interest rates for the entire economy
can collapse asset markets, increase unemployment, raise the debt burdens
of private and public borrowers, redistribute income to top brackets, increase
foreclosures and bankruptcies, and reinforce the monopolistic powers of big
financial institutions.2 6
21 Id. at 247 (reporting brief interruptions in consumer credit control authority for some
months in 1947-1948 and again in 1949-1950).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 250-51. See also Ervin Miller, Monetary Policy in a Changing World, 70 Q. J.
Eco. 22, 34 (1956). Regulation X, which set margin requirements on real estate credit, was
supported on broad social and economic grounds. Its proponents claimed that the terms im-
posed by Regulation X were not always stiff enough to produce their desired effect. See R.J.
Saulnier, An Appeal of Selective Credit Controls, 42 Am. ECON. REV. 247, 251-52, 261-62
(1952).
24 Miller, supra note 23, at 38.
25 See A Bill to Provide Standby Economic Controls, and a Bill to Provide Authority for
Temporary Economic Controls: Hearing on S. 753 and S. 1081 Before the S. Banking and
Currency Comm., 83d Cong. 1472-89 (1953) (statement by William McChesney Martin, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), available at http://www.
docstoc.com/docs/986181/Statement-before-the-Banking-and-Currency-Committee-of-the-
Senate-March-30-1953.
2 See JAMES MEDOFF & ANDREw HARLESS, THE INDEBTED SocIETY: ANATOMY OF AN
ONGOING DISASTER 72-74 (1996); LEON H. KEYSERLING, MONEY, CREDIT, AND INTEREST
RATES: THEIR GROSS MISMANAGEMENT BY THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM (1980) (Keyserling
was the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to President Harry Truman from
1949-1953).
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No one could drive a car for long without the command-and-control
regulations of traffic lights, speed limits, and traffic lanes. Likewise with
financial markets, margin requirements serve important functions by steering
credit away from speculative risk and overheated sectors of the economy
without the need to resort to general monetary measures.
II. THE DEMISE OF THE ECONOMICS OF CONTROL
Over the past four decades, there has been a profound political and
ideological shift away from Keynesian economics and toward deregulation.
The leadership in both major political parties came to see government as
intrusive and incapable of achieving genuine full employment and other
Keynesian policy objectives." Deregulation created an ineffective patch-
work of federal regulations. Meanwhile, replacing selective credit controls
with general monetary measures to manipulate short-term interest rates
helped to fuel unsustainable asset bubbles.
Selective credit controls were first discredited during the latter part of
the Vietnam War, largely a case of guilt by association with President
Nixon's inept and loophole-ridden use of price controls and a symptom of
the general backlash against executive power stemming from Watergate and
related scandals.2" President Carter rejected the economics of control and
soon after was left without any selective policy instruments to contain infla-
tionary forces in commodity markets and consumer goods.2 9 The Federal
Reserve eventually stepped in by using general monetary policy instruments
quite aggressively to restrict the money supply and push up interest rates for
the entire economy. This in turn undermined the viability of other selective
policy instruments, such as depository interest rate ceilings and usury ceil-
ings on mortgage loans.30
Once the government lost control of the general macroeconomic envi-
ronment, the political agenda shifted to formally abolishing selective credit
controls and deregulating banking and finance.31 The Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 liberalized depository inter-
est rate ceilings, preempted state usury ceilings on mortgage loans, and per-
mitted new financial innovations to evade various other legal restrictions.
32
27 MEDOFF & HARLESS, supra note 26, at 72-74.
28 NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN, DONALD E. CULLEN & DAVID LEWIN, THE LABOR SECTOR
617-25 (3d ed. 1980) (analyzing the flaws and loopholes of Nixon's price controls).
29 ALEXANDER CoCKBURN, THE GOLDEN AGE IS IN Us 264 (1995) (discussing President
Carter's rejection of the economics of control as a backlash after the failures of Nixon).
30 Depository interest rate ceilings limited the payment of interest on saving deposits and
prohibited the payment of interest on checking deposits; usury ceilings limit interest rates on
mortgage and other loans. Timothy A. Canova, The Transformation of U.S. Banking and Fi-
nance: From Regulated Competition to Free-Market Receivership, 60 BROOK. L. REv. 1295,
1310-11, 1315-16 (1995).
31 See generally id. at 1314-26 (1995).
3 Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. and 15 U.S.C.).
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Two years later, the Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act 33 com-
pleted the deregulation of depository interest rates, removed regulatory
firewalls between commercial banks and savings and loan associations, and
removed numerous other lending restrictions on loan-to-value ratios, amorti-
zation, aggregate limits, and loan maturities, thereby setting the stage for
such financial innovations as subprime and adjustable rate mortgage loans.3 4
The 1980s saw the dismantling of the intricate patchwork of selective
credit controls that had served for decades to reduce systematic risk by dis-
couraging the development of a subprime mortgage market for borrowers
with bad credit. Without such controls, and with the added incentive of
securitization of subprime loans, lenders started making more and more
loans with no minimum down-payment requirements, and eventually with-
out requiring documentation of income on many loans.35 Variable-rate loans
and loans of shorter maturity soon shifted the risks of rising interest rates
from lenders to borrowers, just as opponents of deregulation had predicted at
the time. Not surprisingly, the rate of business failure and foreclosure in-
creased almost immediately. 36
The deregulatory agenda was politically and ideologically sustained
during the Clinton and Bush II years, fueling a bubble economy based on
easy credit, high debt, low or no margin requirements, and the deterioration
of lending standards. Lending standards were relaxed on Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, govemment-sponsored entities (GSEs) that purchase mort-
gages on the secondary market to pool and sell as mortgage-backed securi-
ties.37 Those who opposed higher margin requirements on housing loans
argued that they would prevent some borrowers, particularly from poor and
minority communities, from purchasing their first homes, thereby impeding
33 Gain-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 1823(c) (1994)).
3 See Canova, supra note 30, at 1320, 1327.
35 DEP'rs OF THE TREASURY AND HousNG AND URBAN DEV., CURBING PREDATORY HOME
MORTGAGE LENDING 29-30 (June 20, 2000), available at http://www.huduser.org/publica-
tions/pdf/treasrpt.pdf.
36 The Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 1347 Before the
Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs,
96th Cong. 131 (1979) (statement of Henry B. Schechter, Director, AFL-CIO Dep't of Urban
Affairs).
37 Steven A. Holmes, Fannie Mae Eases Credit to Aid Mortgage Lending, N.Y. TIMEs,
Sept. 30, 1999 at C2 (discussing Fannie Mae's decision to ease lending standards in response to
pressure from the Clinton administration and banks, thrift institutions, and mortgage compa-
nies); Jay Romano, A Baedeker for First-Time Homebuyers, N.Y. TMEs, March 14, 1999 at
RE1 (reporting three percent margins on Fannie Mae approved mortgage loans). The Comp-
troller of the Currency defended the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), the convenient
scapegoat of Wall Street, arguing that it was not the cause of the wave of subprime lending.
Press Release, Comptroller of the Currency, Comptroller Dugan Says CRA not Responsible
for Subprime Lending Abuses (Nov. 19, 2008), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/re-
lease/2008-136.htm. But see Eliot Spitzer, Op-Ed., Predatory Lenders' Partner in Crime,
WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at A25 (criticizing the Comptroller of the Currency for preempting
all state predatory lending laws in 2003).
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their ability to build up equity capital.38 While such arguments are true,
other approaches might have been used to help low- and middle-income
families save for future homeownership, such as a federal tax deduction for
rental payments to match the current mortgage interest deduction for home-
owners. Policymakers, however, ignored such alternatives, continuing in-
stead to resist implementation of margin requirements.
Meanwhile, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Alan Greenspan's laissez-
faire approach encouraged greater consolidation within the financial sector
and the proliferation of complex financial instruments known as derivatives.
As early as 1997, concerns were raised about the growth of collateralized
debt obligations (CDOs), derivatives that pooled together millions of sub-
prime mortgages and divided their income streams in complex ways.39
Rather than reducing risk, the process of securitization served to increase
risk throughout the financial system. CDOs and other such derivatives
transformed the local risks of subprime lending into a far wider global and
systematic problem. As the size of the subprime mortgage market grew,
some officials became increasingly concerned. In 2000, Edward Gramlich, a
Federal Reserve governor, proposed to Greenspan that the Fed use its discre-
tionary authority to send bank examiners to the offices of such lenders. But
Greenspan was opposed, and Gramlich never brought his concerns to the full
Federal Reserve Board.40
By June 2005, The Economist was referring to the U.S. housing bubble
as "the largest financial bubble in history. ' '41 The debt of American house-
holds was climbing nearly twenty percent a year, the savings rate had fallen
below zero, and the cash being pulled out of homes from mortgage refinanc-
ing had reached about five percent of GDP, creating a bubble in consumer
spending, imported goods, and the value of the dollar itself.42 Fully one out
of every five new mortgages in the United States was subprime. Greenspan
has recently claimed that when he was informed of this alarming statistic in
2005, his original response was that he did not believe the number: "It be-
came a huge revelation. '43
38 These arguments were made by officials within both the Clinton and Bush II adminis-
trations. See, e.g., David Streitfeld & Gretchen Morgenson, Building Flawed American
Dreams, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at Al; Jo Becker, Sheryl Gay Stolberg, & Stephen
Labaton, White House Philosophy Stoked Mortgage Bonfire, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at
Al.
3 9
FRANK PARTNOY, FiAsco: THE INSIDE STORY OF A WALL STREET "IkADER 124-25,
172-76 (1999); See generally Evan M. Gilreath, The Entrance of Banks into Subprime Lend-
ing: First Union and The Money Store, 3 N.C. BANKING INST. 149, 152-54 (1999); Kurt Eg-
gert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REv. 503 (2002).
40 Paul Krugman, A Catastrophe Foretold, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2007, at A25.
4" In Come the Waves: The Global Housing Boom, ECONOMIST, June 16, 2005, at 66-68.42 Timothy A. Canova, Legacy of the Clinton Bubble, DIssErr, Summer 2008, at 47.
43 House of Cards (CNBC broadcast Feb. 12, 2009), available at http:/Ihnn.us/roundup/
comments/67377.html. In fact, Greenspan may have missed the significance of the housing
bubble as late as September 2005. See Edmund L. Andrews, Most Homeowners Not Overly in
Debt, Fed Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2005, at CI (Greenspan stating: "The vast major-
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Since the collapse of the housing bubble, there has been much criticism
of the Fed's easy monetary policy and the low interest rates that had fueled
the rise in housing prices throughout the past two decades. 44 There has been
far less attention paid to the Fed's ideological hostility to selective credit
controls, which could have prevented the growth in all of these bubbles.
Although Greenspan testified to Congress in the middle of the financial
panic of October 2008 that he had discovered a flaw in his model of how the
world works,45 he remains unwilling to consider the use of margin require-
ments as a tool to prevent housing bubbles by preventing the growth of a
large subprime mortgage market.46
In the aftermath of the crash, there has been a lively debate between
monetary economists on the question of how housing and other asset bub-
bles can best be avoided. One school of thought says that central banks
should stop the growth of asset bubbles by raising interest rates 4 7-a blunt
general monetary policy instrument that inflicts damage indiscriminately
through higher foreclosure and bankruptcy rates.48 Others say that central
banks should not attempt to stop asset bubbles because regulators are incapa-
ble of knowing when market prices are too high.4 9 Neither school of thought
appears to have seriously considered the use of selective credit controls as a
way to prevent unsustainable bubbles in the first place by deterring the
overleveraging of assets. 0
ity of homeowners have a sizable equity cushion with which to absorb a potential decline in
house prices.").
44 See, e.g., John B. Taylor, Op-Ed, How Government Created the Financial Crisis, WALL
ST. J., Feb. 9, 2009, at A19; Brian M. Carney, Bernanke Is Fighting the Last War, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 18-19, 2008, at All.
45 Edmund L. Andrews, Greenspan Concedes Flaws In Deregulatory Approach, N.Y.
TIMEs, Oct. 24, 2008 at B 1. See also Obamanomics: Is This Real Change?, (Real News Net-
work internet video posted Nov.25, 2008), available at http://therealnews.coin/t/index.php?
option=comcontent&task=view&id=3 1&Itemid= 7&jumival= 2852 (at 4:22 into the
video).
46 According to Greenspan, "The presumption that you could incrementally defuse a bub-
ble was a fantasy." House of Cards, supra note 43. See also Alan Greenspan, Op-Ed., The
Fed is Blameless on the Property Bubble, FiN. TIMEs, Apr. 7, 2008, at 11 (claiming the Fed
was powerless to "lean against the wind" or eliminate asset bubbles).
47 See, e.g., Paul De Grauwe, Op-Ed., Central Banks Should Prick Asset Bubbles, FIN.
TimEs, Nov. 2, 2007, at 9.
48 See Justin Lahart, Fed Rethinks Stance on Popping Bubbles, WALL ST. J., Oct. 17, 2008,
at A4 (recognizing the dangers of fighting asset bubbles by raising interest rates, "a blunt
instrument with economy-wide effects," and reporting Fed officials as leaning toward regulat-
ing financial firms "with more focus on how they are contributing to risk throughout the
financial system").
49 See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Op-Ed., You Can't Control Animal Spirits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 5,
2008, at A19; Gerald P. O'Driscoll Jr., Op-Ed., To Prevent Bubbles, Restrain the Fed, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 17, 2008, at A19. But cf. Kevin J. Lansing, Asset Price Bubbles, FRBSF Eco-
NOMIC LETIER, Oct. 26, 2007, at 1 (arguing for quantitative economic models to determine
when asset prices have strayed above fundamentals, but silent as to policy tools to prevent rise
in asset prices).
50 See, e.g., Lansing, supra note 49 (silence regarding policy tools to prevent rise in asset
prices).
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As explained above, this blind spot has its costs. For too long, policy-
makers have relied on one general policy instrument to solve all problems-
the adjustment of short-term interest rates. This has been like driving a car
with only an accelerator and a brake, lowering interest rates to spur eco-
nomic growth, then raising interest rates to slow inflation, and all the while
inflating asset bubbles in housing and stock prices, and then bursting those
bubbles. Throughout the past two decades, this approach has undermined all
three of Lerner's main policy objectives. The cycles of inflating and then
deflating asset bubbles have coincided with and exacerbated the booms and
busts of the business cycle, thereby contributing to persistently high levels of
unemployment and underemployment51 and the most top-heavy distribution
of income since the stock market crash of 1929.52 Meanwhile, the financial
industry has become more consolidated, enabling it to capture regulatory
agencies and to engage in monopolistic exploitation of consumers and
homebuyers. Keynes' and Lemer's economics of control were replaced by
the out-of-control economics of unsustainable debt-fueled bubbles.
All of the major players in the subprime fiasco were regulated, but ac-
cording to Lerner's schematic, they were regulated in haphazard and uncoor-
dinated ways. Lenders, brokers, appraisers, bankers, bond insurers, ratings
agencies, and financial engineers of mortgage-backed securities were subject
to various licensing and reporting requirements and to some degree of over-
sight, but often these were requirements that suited their own purposes, such
as limiting competition from potential entrants into their markets. What was
missing was an economics of control specifically designed to contribute to
the objectives of full employment, equitable distributions of income, and the
containment of systematic risk-objectives which, by the 1990s, were con-
sidered either outdated or outside the province of government planning.
III. THE INTRODUCTION OF RIsK-BASED CAPITAL STANDARDS
The post-war Keynesian model of financial regulation, based in large
part on the use of selective credit controls, gradually gave way to deregula-
" Much unemployment and underemployment is hidden and no longer reported in official
government statistics.See Joseph Rosta, U.S. Government Data Needs a Redo, U.S. BANKER,
Feb. 1, 2009, http://www.americanbanker.com/usb_article.html?id=20090126NY3ZJ30
(quoting author that the U-7 measure of underemployment, which used to include discouraged
workers and part-time workers unable to find full-time employment, was politically unpalat-
able and discontinued by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in January 1994).
52 Jesse Drucker, Richest See Income Share Rise, WALL ST. J., July 23, 2008, at A3 (rich-
est one percent of Americans had the highest share of the nation's adjusted gross income for
two decades, and "possibly the highest since 1929," according to Internal Revenue Service
data); Meteor Blades, Wall Street. Main Street. Why No Mention of Side Streets and Alleys?,
DAILY Kos, Oct. 26, 2008, available at http://www.dailykos.comlstoryonly/2008/10/26/
202810/29 (discussing slide in U.S. real wages and increase in the Gini coefficient measure of
income inequality in the U.S.); Anton Troianovski, Majority of Jobless in U.S. Don't Get Bene-
fits, WALL ST. J., July 29, 2008, at A4 (reporting that only thirty-seven percent of unemployed
received benefits in 2007, down from fifty-five percent in 1958).
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tion. Policymakers came to rely instead on general monetary measures as a
response to the asset bubbles that formed in the wake of financial deregula-
tion. Meanwhile, beginning in the 1990s, risk-based capital requirements
largely replaced margin requirements as the primary regulatory tool for en-
suring the strength of financial institutions and containing systematic risk.
In other words, instead of limiting risk through margin requirements at the
initial lending stage by requiring borrowers to post collateral, the new regu-
latory regime permitted all kinds of risky loans to be made and then sought
to contain the risk by requiring banks to keep sufficient capital in reserve.
Although it was not so apparent at first, this represented a transition from
command-and-control margin requirements to self-regulation, as banks were
able to set their own risk-based capital standards.
Capital adequacy rules were supposed to ensure that financial institu-
tions would have sufficient invested capital on hand to absorb likely losses. 53
The capital that banks were required to keep in reserve ranged from equity
issued by banks to long-term debt and other financial instruments. The
amount of capital required to be held in reserve would vary depending on the
nature of a particular asset, with riskier assets requiring more capital in re-
serve. The measurement of risk, therefore, would become crucial to deter-
mine whether a bank had sufficient capital in reserve. But regulators began
to allow banks to rely on their own mathematical calculations to measure the
riskiness of their assets and thus effectively to set their own capital require-
ments.5 4 The banks' mathematical models often gave only the illusion of
safety by measuring the boundaries of risk over short durations and assum-
ing a "normal" market.5 With regulators asleep at the wheel, the banks
themselves had every incentive to under-measure the risk of their assets, and
thereby keep less capital in reserve.
Economists and policymakers failed to learn from history that their risk
models were unrealistic. Greenspan would later testify that he "did not fore-
cast a significant decline [in the housing market] because we had never had
a significant decline in prices. 5 6 He was apparently not aware of the enor-
13 PETER MOLES & NICHOLAS TERRY, THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
TRmIs (1997), at 40-41, 71 (defining "Basle [sic] Capital Convergence Accord" and "capital
adequacy," respectively).
' This was done by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, the international body
that governs how banks set their capital requirements through an accord known as Basel H. See
generally Jeffery Atik, Basel II and Extreme Risk Analysis (Feb. 13, 2009) (working paper for
American Society of International Law, International Economic Law Research Colloquium,
UCLA School of Law), available at http://www.asil.org/files/atik.pdf; Joe Nocera, Risk Man-
agement, N.Y. TtMES, Jan. 4, 2009, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
55 See Nocera, supra note 54. Ida Hoos criticized the technical focus of traditional sys-
tems analysis: "A kind of quantomania prevails in the assessment of technologies. What can-
not be counted simply doesn't count, and so we systematically ignore large and important areas
of concern." Ida R. Hoos, Societal Aspects of Technology Assessment, 13 TECHNOLOGICAL
FORECASTING AND SOC. CHANGE 191, 193 (1979).
56 Tim Rutten, Op-Ed., What the Oracle Didn't See, L.A. Tims, Oct. 25, 2008, at A23
(quoting Greenspan testimony to a House committee). See also Alan Greenspan, Op-Ed., We
Will Never Have a Perfect Model of Risk, FIN. TmEs, March 17, 2008, at 9 (claiming risk
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mous drop in housing prices between 1929 and 193157 and therefore did not
consider the possibility of significant housing price declines in his model.
Similarly, credit rating agencies like Moody's, Standard & Poor's, and
Fitch routinely gave high ratings to mortgage-backed securities" by estimat-
ing low delinquency rates on the underlying mortgages, basing their calcula-
tions on a relatively short view of historical performance. The ratings
agencies, like the banks, determined their risk-based mathematical models
by looking through a rearview mirror to determine future performance; but
the rearview mirror reflected constantly rising housing prices and inflated
appraisals, conditions that could not possibly last.5 9
Some banking and finance experts have proposed making bank capital
requirements contra-cyclical by relating the capital adequacy requirements to
the rate of change of bank lending and asset prices in relevant sectors, such
as changes in mortgage lending and housing prices.6° These experts claim
that the contra-cyclical approach would build up capital reserves and restrain
bank lending during asset price booms while encouraging bank lending dur-
ing asset price deflations. A final benefit of this approach would be "to
reduce pressure from the financial system for central banks to adjust mone-
tary policy in the heat of the moment" 6 -or, in other words, to reduce the
need for the Fed to step on either the brake or the accelerator in a crisis.
But others criticize this proposal because it could be extremely difficult
to determine the proper cyclical indicator for a particular security held by a
financial institution.61 For example, if tranches of a CDO63 included parts of
mortgage loans pooled from widely varied geographic locations, some from
markets where housing is booming and others where housing is relatively
management systems can never anticipate wild swings between euphoria and fear, and there-
fore what's needed is market flexibility and open competition).
" See. KEYNES, supra note 9, at 174-75 (reporting steep declines in the U.S. in farm
values, urban properties, and housing, down thirty to forty percent across the board, an im-
mense problem because "such property is ordinarily regarded as relatively free from risk").
" See generally MOLES & TERRY, supra note 53, at 361 (defining mortgage-backed secur-
ity as a "security issued on the basis of a share in a group (or pool) of mortgages or trust
deeds").
19 As a result of its flawed ratings, Moody's had to downgrade more than five-thousand
securities in 2007 alone. See Mathew Padilla, Did the Agencies Rating Mortgage Bonds Let
Greed Trump Common Sense?, ORANGE CouNTY REG. (Cal.), May 10, 2008, available at
http://mortgage.freedomblogging.com2008/05/10/did-the-agencies-rating-mortgage-bonds-
let-greed-trump-common-sense/.
60 See, e.g., Charles Goodhart & Avinash Persaud, Op-Ed, A Proposal for How to Avoid
the Next Crash, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2008, at 9 (discussing the Basel I1 capital adequacy
regime).
61 Id.
62 See Charles Freeland, Letter to the Editor, Basel II a Big Improvement on Outdated
Model, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at 10. Freeland is a former deputy secretary general of the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.
63 A CDO is a type of mortgage-backed bond where ownership of the mortgages have
been sold to individual investors and the repayments of principal and interest are separated into
different maturity streams, known as tranches. See MOLES & TERRY, supra note 53, at 91
(defining "collateralized mortgage obligation"), 361 (defining "mortgage-backed security"),
and 560 (defining "tranche").
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weaker, it would be impractical to link the required capital reserve to hous-
ing prices.
Some liberal legal scholars have suggested a second alternative to the
use of margin requirements for containing risk in the financial markets,
namely the creation of so-called "suitability claims" against financial insti-
tutions for predatory lending in the markets for housing and consumer
loans. 64 But suitability claims would be a way of shifting losses, not neces-
sarily preventing losses. This litigation approach would also require a case-
by-case determination of when a particular loan was not suitable to the needs
of a particular borrower. A bright line rule would be more effective: adjust-
able rate mortgages with no minimum down payment requirements should
be seen as inherently unsuitable for borrowers, and inherently unstable for
the financial system. Like an unsafe vehicle, they should simply be prohib-
ited from the highway of commerce.
A third alternative to margin requirements would be to require greater
transparency in underlying mortgage loans and perhaps for investment banks
and hedge funds involved in creating and trading mortgage-backed securi-
ties.65 But it is unclear how disclosure would dissuade borrowers from stak-
ing bets on the movement of asset prices during the boom stages of a bubble.
There was already plenty of disclosure to borrowers mandated through Truth
in Lending regulations and to purchasers of securities through federal securi-
ties disclosure requirements. 66 With no minimum down payment require-
ments, a significant percentage of the underlying mortgage loans will always
be suspect and inherently unstable.67
Margin requirements are the best way to remedy this situation, by en-
suring that borrowers are credit-worthy, have sufficient savings, and are not
over-leveraged in their borrowing. This will strike some liberal scholars as
overly paternalistic, as the logic of margin requirements suggests that mort-
gages and loans for autos and other large consumer purchases should not be
made in the first place to borrowers with limited resources. But in the end,
there really is no risk-based substitute, nor litigation nor disclosure substi-
tute, for selective credit controls-the traffic lights and speed limits and
other safety standards that keep some cars off the road. Minimum down
payment requirements will keep most of the riskier borrowers from taking
64 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1317-39 (2002).
65 See Richard H. Thaler & Cass R. Sunstein, Op-Ed., Disclosure Is the Best Kind of
Credit Regulation, WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 2008, at A17; Richard Thaler & Cass Sunstein, Op-
Ed., Human Frailty Caused This Crisis, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 12, 2008, at 11; Cass R. Sunstein &
Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CH. L. REv. 1159
(2003).
' See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006); see also Engel & McCoy,
supra note 64, at 1334-35 (arguing that disclosure is inadequate since it fails to mandate pre-
cise and essential information, and thereby fails to provide adequate protection to investors).
67 Cf Alan M. White, The Case for Banning Subprime Mortgages, U. CtN. L. REV. (forth-
coming 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1133609.
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on debts that they likely cannot afford. Moreover, with selective credit con-
trols, when bank lending and housing prices in particular regions escalate
too much too quickly, bank regulators could simply clamp down by raising
minimum down payment requirements and restricting the use of adjustable
interest rates and balloon payments. Such regulation would mean fewer
mortgage loans for marginal borrowers, but it would also reduce the system-
atic risks facing the financial system.
IV. AGENCY CAPTURE AND REVOLVING DOORS
The failure of regulatory policy and the headlong rush into deregulation
was the natural consequence of major institutional flaws. Several factors
have contributed to the capture of key federal regulatory agencies by the
nation's financial services industry. One of these is the so-called "revolving
door," the tendency of regulatory officials to leave their government posts
for lucrative positions in the private financial industry. The movement of
key personnel back and forth between regulators and regulated has become
incestuous. Policy naturally comes to reflect the bargain of the moment be-
tween the most powerful private interests.
For instance, in 2003 and 2004, the biggest Wall Street investment
banks, led by Henry Paulson, then the head of Goldman Sachs, lobbied the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB) for a number of key regulatory changes. The SEC
commissioners unanimously granted the banks an exemption from the net
capital rule, thereby permitting their brokerage units to transfer their reserves
up to their parent companies and enabling the banks to invest more funds in
mortgage-backed securities, credit derivatives, and other exotic financial in-
struments.68 Meanwhile, the FASB, with SEC acquiescence, ruled that these
same banks could use off-balance-sheet entities to evade capital require-
ments for these same asset-backed securities.69 As a result of these two reg-
ulatory changes, the nation's largest investment banks were able to hide
massive holdings of toxic assets, such as commercial and residential mort-
61 See Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at Al.
69 See Corporate Accounting Practices: Is There a Credibility GAAP?: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises of the
H. Comm. on Fin. Services, 107th Cong. 152-63, 293 (2002) (testimony of Robert K. Herd-
man, Chief Accountant, SEC). Reagan era financial deregulation foreshadowed the hiding of
worthless assets through phony accounting, the lifting of capital requirements and overleverag-
ing of financial institutions, and the bailout of those same institutions. For instance, in 1981
the Reagan administration sat idly by as the Federal Reserve authorized U.S. financial institu-
tions to establish International Banking Facilities as bookkeeping entities to attract offshore
deposits. IBFs were exempt from various federal regulations, including reserve requirements,
federal deposit insurance requirements, and interest rate ceilings. Canova, supra note 30, at
1308.
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gage-backed securities containing subprime mortgages made without margin
requirements.7 0
The role of Henry Paulson illustrates how the revolving door spins both
ways. Paulson succeeded in his efforts to allow Goldman Sachs and other
financial institutions to hide their toxic assets by excluding them from their
balance sheets, to evade capital requirements, and to use their reserves to
become over-leveraged-in effect, to perpetuate a giant fraud on investors
and the public alike. He then moved on to become Treasury secretary, from
which position he was able to help prop up these same investment banks,
eventually through the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).7 1 Paulson's
pattern of behavior was consistent with theories of "control fraud," which
suggest that defrauders will use corporate and other entities to engage in
massive frauds, and then use their control over the same corporate entities
and the agencies of government to cover their tracks and hide their
malfeasance.7 2
Paulson's path through the revolving door was paved by others who had
jumped from top Wall Street positions into top posts in previous administra-
tions. Robert Rubin, for example, was the head of Goldman Sachs before
becoming a top White House advisor and then Treasury secretary in the
Clinton administration. He then returned to the private sector, joining Ci-
tigroup's top management. While he worked in the Clinton administration,
Rubin influenced policy to the benefit of the short-term interests of the fi-
nancial industry and in ways that would undermine the stability of the finan-
cial system. For instance, even as Rubin was negotiating to step down from
his position as Treasury secretary and become co-chair of Citigroup with a
lucrative compensation package, he was taking part in the lobbying effort
that culminated in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Moderniza-
tion Act of 1999. 71 This Act swept aside significant portions of the Glass-
Steagall Act,74 an early New Deal measure that created regulatory firewalls
to keep commercial banks and insurance companies out of the riskier busi-
70 See Alan Reinstein et al., Consolidation of Variable-Interest Entities: Applying the Pro-
visions of FIN 46(R), CPA J., Aug. 1, 2006, at 28; Pierre F. de Ravel d'Esclapon, FASB Inter-
pretation No. 46, An Overview (Feb. 10, 2004); Press Release, SEC, SEC Office of the Chief
Accountant and FASB Staff Clarifications on Fair Value Accounting (Sept. 30, 2008), availa-
ble at http:l/www.sec.gov/newslpress/2008/2008-234.htm.
See Greg Ip, Fed Balance Sheet Worries Volcker, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2008, at A3.
72 See WILLIAM K. BLACK, THE BEST WAY TO ROB A BANK IS TO OWN ONE (2005);
William K. Black, Control Fraud and Control Freaks, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN CRIME
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 67-80 (Henry N. Pontell & David Shichor eds., 2000); William K.
Black, "Control Frauds" as Financial Super-Predators: How "Pathogens" Make Financial
Markets Inefficient, 34 J. OF SocIo-EcoNOMIcs 734 (2005); William K. Black, Control Fraud
as an Explanation for White-Collar Crime Waves: The Case of the Savings & Loan Debacle,
43 CRIME, L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (2005).
" Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat.
1338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
" See Keith Bradsher, Rubin's Plan for Banking Spurs Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1995,
at DI (reporting Rubin's early attempt to abolish the Glass-Steagall Act).
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ness of investment banking.7" Until these provisions of Glass-Steagall were
repealed, Citigroup had faced the possibility of having to sell off its Trav-
elers Insurance underwriting subsidiary.
7 6
At the time, Rubin openly boasted of his lobbying efforts on behalf of
the 1999 deregulation measures, though he later backtracked by claiming
that his role was limited to urging preservation of Community Reinvestment
Act (CRA) provisions in the final bill.77 Nevertheless, the Clinton Justice
Department never brought charges against Rubin for violating the Ethics in
Government Act.78 In fact, some of those who warned against gutting the
Glass-Steagall Act were punished. John Moscow, the New York Federal
Reserve Bank's deputy general counsel, was forced to resign after warning
that the results of combining the prudential culture of commercial banking
and insurance with the risk-taking culture of securities "could be cata-
strophic" and that there was not a regulator capable of fully monitoring the
multi-state, multi-national full-service financial giants that would result from
repeal of Glass-Steagall.7 9
The case of Robert Rubin may seem more egregious than most, with its
revolving door from Goldman Sachs to the White House to Treasury to Ci-
tigroup, coinciding with his involvement in gutting the Glass-Steagall Act to
the benefit of his future employment and a sanctimonious defense of his
actions. But the dynamic at play in the cases of Paulson and Rubin has
become all too routine in the world of financial regulation, and it has helped
to foster a group-think mentality-an echo chamber-within the top eche-
lons of decision-making.
" See Joseph Kahn, Former Treasury Secretary Joins Leadership Triangle at Citigroup,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1999, at Al.
76 See id. With the demise of the Glass-Steagall firewalls, banks were free to load up on
riskier investments, including CDOs and other mortgage-backed securities, through affiliated
entities such as their own hedge funds and other special investment vehicles. The old Regula-
tion W that had authorized margin requirements for consumer credit was re-written to cover
the transactions between banks and their securities affiliates. The old Regulation W was di-
rected to the safety and soundness of lending, and was prudential and preventive in nature.
The new Regulation W was now directed to the opaque transactions between affiliates within
financial conglomerates, and its approach was more akin to monitoring problems only after the
horse has left the barn. See Canova, supra note 42, at 46.
77See Kahn, supra note 75, at C15.
7 See Joseph Kahn, Consumer Groups Seek Ethics Inquiry on Rubin's New Job, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1999, at C17.
7 9 See John W. Moscow, Op-Ed, Bigger Banks, Bigger Problems, N.Y. TIMES, June 28,
1995, at A19 (warning that "what we do not have is an agency capable of overseeing the
monster companies that would follow the repeal of Glass-Steagall"); Peter Truell, New York
Fed Official Resigns Over Article in The Times, N.Y. TiMES, July 21, 1995, at B6. Those in
favor of deregulation, such as Charles Calomiris and David Leonhardt, claim that the gutting
of Glass-Steagall has allowed large financial firms to merge and come to each other's rescue,
and thereby to act as stabilizers when the financial system went into crisis in 2008. Charles W.
Calomiris, Op-Ed., Most Pundits are Wrong About the Bubble, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2008, at
A13; David Leonhardt, Washington's Invisible Hand, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 28, 2008, § MM
(Magazine), at 32. But it was the Federal Reserve and the federal taxpayer that ultimately had
to come to the rescue of even these financial behemoths.
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The revolving door is now sometimes less visible than in the past, as
former regulatory officials, former members of Congress, and even former
presidents have begun moving seamlessly into unregistered and unregulated
hedge funds, either managing such funds or simply parking their financial
holdings there. For instance, when the Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) hedge fund suddenly melted down in October 1998, it was revealed
that a former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board was among its top
partners.80 Likewise, Larry Summers was a managing director for D.E.
Shaw & Co., one of the nation's largest and most successful hedge funds,
before becoming a top economic advisor to President Obama.8 1 Perhaps it
should not be a surprise that the Obama administration's attempt to revamp
TARP has produced a murky plan to spend as much as two trillion dollars to
guarantee purchases by hedge funds of unmarketable mortgage-backed as-
sets from the nation's largest financial institutions, with the prices set by the
hedge funds themselves.82
Rubin and other policymakers with Wall Street ties also played a signif-
icant role in the deregulation of derivatives, those complex financial instru-
ments whose values are derived from other underlying assets or indices.83
Throughout the 1990s, there were periodic calls for extending capital re-
quirements to derivatives, but these attempts were stymied by Greenspan,
Rubin, and Summers,84 and in his final weeks in office, Bill Clinton signed
into law the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, which shielded
the market for derivatives from federal regulation. Rubin has since denied
wrongdoing, claiming that he supported regulating derivatives but saw no
way of doing so since all the forces in the industry were arrayed against it.
But Michael Greenberger, who was a senior director at the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission (CFTC) at the time, has argued that the political
climate would have been different had Rubin, the Treasury secretary, called
for regulation.85
8 See Judith H. Dobrzynski, the Markets Are Back. But More Problems Await, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 14, 2001, at CI (noting that former Fed vice chairman David W. Mullins, Jr. was
among Long-Term Capital Management's partners).
"I See Eamon Javers, Summers Has Ties to Prominent Hedge Fund, POLrrsco, Nov. 28,
2008, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1 108/15995.html.
" See Krishna Guha & Alan Beattie, $2,000bn Financial Clean-Up, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 11,
2009, at 1 (reporting plan to create Public Private Investment Fund to buy up to $1 trillion of
toxic assets "at prices established by private co-investors"); Edmund L. Andrews, Eric Dash,
& Graham Bowley, Toxic Asset Plan Foresees Big Subsidies for Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
21, 2009, at Al.
83 On the danger of derivatives generally, see BBC News, Buffett Warns on Investment
'Time Bomb', Mar. 4, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/business/2817995.stm (containing War-
ren Buffett's description of derivatives as "financial weapons of mass destruction").
I See Peter S. Goodman, Taking Hard New Look at a Greenspan Legacy, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2008, at A l (reporting how Greenspan, Rubin, and Summers undermined the efforts of
Brooksley Born, head of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), when she
sounded the alarm about unregulated derivatives in 1997 and again after the meltdown of
Long-Term Capital Management).
85 See id.
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Without margin or capital requirements on derivatives, these complex
instruments have grown in size and become gigantic wagers on the credit-
worthiness of major companies and the movement of interest rates, com-
modity prices, and currency values.86 Today the notional amount (face
value) of the credit default swap (CDS) market is roughly forty-five trillion
dollars-about half the total U.S. household wealth; five times the national
debt; and more than three times the U.S. gross national product, the total
sum of all goods and services produced annually in the United States. 7 The
notional amount of interest rate derivatives and exchange rate derivatives is
even more mind-boggling, at more than $500 trillion and growing, ap-
proaching the disturbing milestone of one quadrillion dollars.88 These specu-
lative bets have indeed become the tail wagging the dog. As Keynes
famously wrote in The General Theory:
Speculators may do no harm as bubbles on a steady stream of en-
terprise. But the position is serious when enterprise becomes the
bubble on a whirl-pool of speculation. When the capital develop-
ment of a country becomes a by-product of the activities of a ca-
sino, the job is likely to be ill-done.89
Unfortunately, it is not possible to conclude with any certainty that "but
for" any particular regulatory reform the current financial crisis could have
been averted. However, it is likely that a coordinated regulatory scheme in
accordance with the economics of Keynes and Lemer would have provided
substantial protection to the stability of the financial system. But perhaps it
should not be a surprise that, instead of an economics of control, we now
have an economy out of control. The officials who have been responsible
for designing our financial regulatory system are so often only a revolving
door away from reaping the rewards of unregulated speculation.
V. THE BASTARD KEYNESIANISM OF THE BAILOUT
The British economist Joan Robinson, who worked with Keynes, first
coined the term Bastard Keynesianism to refer to a narrow interpretation of
Keynes's General Theory that ignores the larger Keynesian regulatory
framework and reduces Keynesian principles to an embrace of short-run
6 In the 1990s, as chair of the House Banking Committee, the late Henry B. Gonzalez had
warned that the Federal Reserve was creating a giant casino economy supported by a "mon-
strous bubble." Canova, supra note 42, at 41.
87 See George Soros, Op-Ed., The False Belief at the Heart of the Financial Turmoil, FiN.
TIMES, Apr. 3, 2008, at 15.
88 See Paul B. Farrell, Derivatives the New 'Ticking Bomb': Buffett and Gross Warn: $516
Trillion Bubble Is a Disaster Waiting to Happen, MARKET WATCH, Mar. 10, 2008, available at
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/derivatives-are-the-new-ticking-time-bomb.
89 KEYNrs, supra note 3, at 159.
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countercyclical stabilization through monetary and fiscal stimulus.90 Lynn
Turgeon later expanded on Robinson's description to classify those who
would use Keynesian analysis to justify fiscal stimulus while departing from
other important Keynesian policy goals. 91 For instance, Commercial Keyne-
sians pursue fiscal stimulus as Keynes prescribed, but by favoring tax-cut-
ting fiscal stimulus over public investment they often depart from such key
Keynesian objectives as better income distributions. The current orthodoxy
in Washington and on Wall Street resembles a Bastard Keynesian approach
to financial regulation: it focuses on monetary and fiscal stimulus while
missing the significance of other aspects of Keynesian analysis, most partic-
ularly its emphasis on an economics of control.92 Perhaps it would be fair to
label today's Bastard Keynesians "Wall Street Keynesians" because of their
emphasis on policies that will help the financial elite rather than investing in
jobs and income support for the largest sectors of the polity. The current
economic recovery program, centered on the financial bailout described be-
low, is a typical product of their approach.
A. A Bailout for Wall Street Before Main Street
The Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) is a prime illustration of
the current uncoordinated approach to regulation. It is without clear objec-
tives or sufficient transparency. From the beginning, the program has been
administered by officials almost straight from Wall Street. Paulson chose
Neel Kashkari, his former lieutenant at Goldman Sachs, to head the new
Office of Financial Stability and administer the $700 billion program.9 3
Similarly, Timothy Geithner moved directly from his position as head of the
New York Federal Reserve Bank to Treasury secretary. He chose Mark Pat-
terson, a top lobbyist at Goldman Sachs, to serve as his chief of staff, which
required an immediate exemption from President Obama's new lobbying
ethics rules.9 4
The ongoing operation of the revolving door in the Obama administra-
tion suggests that many of the problems discussed above will continue, in
particular the tailoring and administration of financial regulatory policy to
9' See generally Amitava Krishna Dutt, Joan Robinson, in AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF KEYNE-
SIAN ECONOMICS 554, at 556 (Thomas Cate ed., 1997) (reporting Bastard Keynesianism as an
interpretation of The General Theory as simply an "economics of disequlibrium" and a ten-
dency of neoclassical economics to interpret equilibrium as the outcome of a process and its
use of the mechanical concept of logical time).
91 See LYNN TURGEON, BASTARD KEYNESIANISM: THE EVOLUTION OF ECONOMIC THINKING
AND POLICYMAKING SINCE WORLD WAR IT (1996). Turgeon also characterized those who seek
fiscal stimulus based on defense spending and constructing prisons rather than creating a full-
employment economy as military-Keynesians and penal-Keynesians, respectively.
92 See Interview by Chris Wallace with Barack Obama, President of the United States, in
Marion, Ind. (Fox News television broadcast Apr. 27, 2008), available at http://www.foxnews.
comlstory/0,2933,352785,00.html.
9' David Cho, Paulson Advisor to Oversee Rescue, WASH. POST, Oct. 6, 2008, at A12.
4 See T.W. Farnam, Ethics Order Affects Aide to Geithner, WALL ST. J., Jan. 28, 2009, at
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serve the narrow interests of Wall Street, rather than the public interests of
Main Street. For example, within three months of Kashkari's appointment,
the Congressional Oversight Panel headed by Harvard Law professor Eliza-
beth Warren released a report that TARP had overpaid at least $78 billion to
Wall Street banks and financial institutions for stocks and other assets.95
Meanwhile, the banks receiving TARP money continued paying large com-
pensation packages to their executives and dividends to shareholders, includ-
ing foreign shareholders. 96
One stated objective of TARP is to get banks to lend to businesses and
consumers again. But its approach is trickle down, injecting funds into
banks while ignoring the deterioration of the real economy and the rising
tide of mortgage foreclosures, bankruptcies, and defaults at the base of the
credit pyramid.97 In short, it is an approach that has ignored the fundamental
Keynesian lessons that mass purchasing power must be maintained in the
middle class by promoting high employment and an equitable distribution of
income.
The disregard of Keynesian insights is replicated in the legal academy.
For instance, Lucian Bebchuk has written about credit market failure simply
as the result of banks' irrational lack of confidence in the lending of other
banks.98 Bebchuk's approach could marginalize rational concerns about the
declining financial prospects of borrowers due to recessionary economic
conditions. He assumes that there are "good projects" not being financed
simply because of a somewhat technical "coordination failure" among fi-
9 See Regulator Says Bailout Fund is Misleading the Public, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at
B2.
96 See Ben White, What Red Ink? Wall Street Paid Hefty Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2009, at A l (reporting financial industry executive bonuses of $18.4 billion); Binyamin Appel-
baum, Banks to Continue Paying Dividends, WASH. POST, Oct. 30, 2008, at AI (reporting that
U.S. banks receiving $163 billion in TARP funds were paying shareholders about $7 billion in
the 4th quarter of 2008); William Patalon III How Are Banks Spending Bailout Money? Any-
one's Guess, SEEKING ALPHA, Jan. 6, 2009, http://seekingalpha.com/article/I 13464-how-are-
banks-spending-bailout-money-anyone-s-guess (citing Associate Press survey of twenty-one
banks receiving at least one billion dollars in TARP funding, with the biggest banks refusing to
disclose information on how the money was spent).
"7 See David Enrich et al., Bank Lending Keeps Dropping, WALL ST. J., APRIL 20, 2009, at
Al, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124019360346233883.html (concluding, ac-
cording to analysis of Treasury Department data, that the biggest recipients of TARP aid made
or refinanced twenty-three percent less in new loans in February 2009 than in October 2008);
Business Digest: Lending Declines at Bailed-Out Banks, WASH. POST, June 16, 2009, at A14,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontentlarticle/2009/06/15/AR20090615
03066_2.html (reporting that the value of loans held by the 21 largest financial institutions
receiving TARP support fell in April 2009 by 0.8 percent from the previous month, the fifth
decline in six months, and that consumer lending fell one percent during the same period);
Peter S. Goodman and Jack Healy, Job Losses Push Safer Mortgages to Foreclosure, N.Y.
TIMES, May 25, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/business/econ-
omy/25foreclose.html.
91 See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Unfreezing Credit Markets, (Jon M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ.,
& Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 622, 2008), available at http://pa-
pers.ssrn.comlabstract= 1315436.
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nancial institutions.99 Although he supports government financing and loan
guarantees for bank lending, Bebchuk's approach could prove ineffective
precisely because it does nothing to firm up declining aggregate demand.
The financial bailout approaches of both the Bush and Obama adminis-
trations have suffered the same deficiencies. They have pumped trillions of
dollars into failing banks and financial markets but without receiving ade-
quate control over their operations. For instance, without any seats on the
boards of these financial institutions, the federal government has lacked the
ability to command or control any changes in management policies, includ-
ing the payment of obligations to counterparties on derivative contracts, bo-
nuses to executives, and dividends to shareholders. 100 TARP's shortcomings
illustrate that the ideological resistance to an economics of control-the
same market fundamentalist ideology that helped create the financial cri-
sis-is now impeding recovery.
B. A Crisis in the Rule of Law
The institutional flaws of the present regulatory system are profound.
As predicted by public choice theories, special interests-the financial insti-
tutions themselves-have largely captured the most important regulatory
agencies, thereby ensuring that regulation will be uncoordinated and ineffec-
tive. 10' While TARP has received the lion's share of public scrutiny, a larger
and more significant bailout has been proceeding off the Treasury's balance
sheet, through the Federal Reserve System. Throughout 2008, the Fed stum-
bled from one subsidy to another, granting them first to its commercial bank-
ing constituency, then to investment banks that were not even members of
the Federal Reserve System, and finally to the money markets themselves. 0 2
9 See Lucian Bebchuk & Itay Goldstein, Self-fulfilling Credit Market Freezes (John M.
Olin ctr. For Law, Econ., & Bus., Harvard Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 623, 2008), availa-
ble at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1315462#.
"o Contrast the U.S. bailout approach with Sweden's 1992 bank bailout. See Peter Thar
Larsen & Chris Giles, Self-assembly Solution, FIN. TIMES, March 18, 2009, at 8 (quoting Arne
Berggren, Sweden's finance ministry official responsible for its bank restructuring: "'We were
a no-bullshit investor-we were very brutal.' The authorities also insisted on control. 'You
take command. If you put in equity, you have to get into the management of the business,
[otherwise] management is focused on saving the skins of the [remaining private] sharehold-
ers."') (emphasis added).
'o' See, e.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Politi-
cal Influence, 98 Q.J. EcON. 371 (1983). Regulatory policy will tend to benefit coherent spe-
cial interest groups at the expense of the general public. Jonathan A. Macey, Promoting
Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 223, 230-32 (1986).
012 In the fall of 2008, the Federal Reserve began using a new tool, paying banks interest
on their reserves held by the Fed. In the first four months, from September 2008 to January
2009, the volume of bank reserves held by the Fed rose from $44 billion to $901 billion.
Through this program, the Fed has been paying banks not to lend, a policy at odds with the
needs of the U.S. economy and the stated objectives of Congress and the president, but appar-
ently aligned with the interests of the Fed's banking constituency. See Robert D. Auerbach,
The Fed's Backroom Bailout Policy, 12 CHAPMAN L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at
5, on file with the Harvard Law School Library).
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In May 2008, former Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker, now an
Obama economic advisor, worried out loud that the Fed's independence
could be hurt by the wide variety of assets it had taken onto its balance sheet
to help its banking constituency. His concern was that the Fed might be
viewed "as the rescuer or supporter of a particular section of the market,
[which] is not strictly a monetary function in the way it's been interpreted in
the past."'03 By year's end, the Fed was outright purchasing commercial
paper as well as toxic assets such as mortgage-backed securities. The Fed's
balance sheet skyrocketed from around $850 billion in assets in late 2007 to
more than $1.7 trillion in October 2008.104 In March 2009, the Fed expanded
its support to the long-term Treasury bond market and other securitized as-
sets by announcing it would pump another $1.2 trillion into those markets.0 5
As Volcker predicted, the perception of the Fed as working in the service of
the financial services industry is increasingly accurate.
Lerner warned against monopoly exploitation. Perhaps the greatest of
the monopolies is the one hidden in plain sight, the Federal Reserve itself.106
Perhaps the time has come to consider significant institutional reform of the
Federal Reserve. Over the years there have been numerous constitutional
challenges to the Federal Reserve and its policy-making Federal Open Mar-
ket Committee based on the private non-delegation doctrine as well as the
Appointments Clause. The D.C. Circuit has dismissed each challenge on
narrow procedural grounds, including lack of standing for private plaintiffs
and the doctrine of equitable discretion for claims brought by congressional
plaintiffs. The U.S. Supreme Court has rejected petitions for certiorari in
each case.' °7
Meanwhile, the legal academy has been largely silent and therefore
complicit in the enormous violation of the rule of law at the nation's central
bank. 108 Conservative scholars rail against unconstitutional delegations but
then ignore the most flagrant example of the Federal Reserve. Liberal schol-
ars who purportedly care about a progressive social agenda defer to dog-
matic law and economics assumptions about the wisdom of central bank
independence. Arguments are routinely made that it is better to have
unelected bureaucrats decide monetary policy than to trust elected officials.
103 Greg Ip, Fed Balance Sheet Worries Volcker, WALL ST. J., May 15, 2008, at A3.
Posting of Phil Izzo to Wall St. J. Blogs, http://blogs.wsj.comeconomics/2008/10/22/
feds-balance-sheet-keeps-growing-and-growing/ (Oct. 22, 2008 15:52 EST).
'O Neil Irwin, Fed to Pump $1.2 Trillion Into Markets, WASH. POST, Mar. 19, 2009, at
AO01. o6 See generally Timothy A. Canova, Closing the Border and Opening the Door: Mobil-
ity, Adjustment, and the Sequencing of Reform, 5 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 341, 403-09 (2007).
107 See id. at 404.
108 See, e.g., CASS R. So.smIn', THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS 54-55 (2004) (defending
broad delegations of congressional authority to administrative agencies); Cass R. Sunstein,
Paradoxes of the Regulatory State, 57 U. CH. L. REv. 407, 441 n.89 (1990) (characterizing
the Federal Reserve Board as an independent agency not susceptible to capture, while ignoring
the private industry ownership of the regional Federal Reserve Banks); Cass R. Sunstein,
Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315 (2000) (dismissing the nondelegation doctrine
without reference to delegations to private groups).
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The empirical evidence, it is asserted, shows that independent central banks
ensure low inflation. But the autonomous Fed has presided over the greatest
inflation of asset prices in human history, a bubble that has now gone bust.
VI. A NEW ECONOMICS OF CONTROL: CONNECTING FUNCTIONAL
REGULATION TO FUNCTIONAL FINANCE
It is crucial that the proper balance of functional regulation be put in
place now. As Keynes wrote in 1931, after the stock market collapse but
when there still may have been time to correct course: "Modem capitalism
is faced, in my belief, with the choice between finding some way to increase
money values towards their former figure, or seeing widespread insolvencies
and defaults and the collapse of a large part of the financial structure.""')
Between 1931 and 1933, the wrong course was chosen, as insufficient stimu-
lus was directed toward raising either money values of assets or the income
levels of debtors. As a result, the financial structure crumbled. Much the
same is happening today as the portion of the financial rescue effort commit-
ted to large institutions continues to dwarf assistance for debtors, either in
the form of mortgage loan modification programs or jobs programs. With-
out the proper regulatory system in place, there could be an intensification of
financial crisis in any of a number of markets.
Because of the vital need for coordinated regulation, the intellectual
resistance to the economics of control should be set aside. This resistance
has always been muddled. It fails to recognize that command-and-control
regulation is not necessarily a movement away from the price mechanism.
According to Robert Skidelsky, Keynes himself rejected rationing and saw
his framework as a defense of the price system and consumer choice."0 It is
important to remember that advocates of margin requirements have never
sought to outlaw consumer choice but simply to constrain consumer choice
at the margins. Without such discipline-without traffic lights, stop signs,
and an occasional toll booth in the financial marketplace-those with privi-
leged positions in the marketplace will follow their incentives to become
overleveraged and to gamble with other people's money. They will continue
to present a moral hazard to the marketplace as a result of their ability to
benefit from bailouts and hidden subsidies."'
The regulatory devices of capital, margin, and reserve requirements are
best seen as a way to ensure that incentives are properly aligned. In recent
years, there has been a growing literature in the law and development field,
popularized by Hernando de Soto, promoting the protection of property
'09 KEYNES, supra note 9, at 177.
"o ROBERT SKIDELSKY, JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, VOLUME THREE: FIGHTING FOR FREE-
DOM 1937-1946 67 (2000).
1" See generally Melvin I. Urofsky, Op-Ed, The Value of 'Other People's Money', N.Y.
TiMEs, Feb. 7, 2009, at A24 (recounting the history of the 1914 book by Louis Brandeis, Other
People's Money, and How the Bankers Use It).
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rights of investors." 2 What has been missing, in the United States more than
in the developing world, has been an appreciation of the obligations of in-
vestors, beginning with the obligation to put some portion of their own capi-
tal at risk. If the present financial crisis is to be contained, and if modem
capitalism is to be saved from its own excesses, the "capital" must be put
back into capitalism, a project that will require coordinating anew the tools
of capital, margin, and reserve requirements that helped to create financial
stability in the decades after World War II. During World War II, the federal
government spent twice as much as today, as a percentage of GDP, and the
Federal Reserve kept interest rates at near zero to facilitate such public sec-
tor efforts. But such low interest rates did not spill over into speculation in
asset markets such as the stock market or housing precisely because margin
requirements steered credit away from those markets.
It should be noted that although margin and capital requirements could
limit the growth of derivatives in the future, they would not address the
overleveraging that already exists in these markets. For instance, while news
of the American Insurance Group's (A.I.G.) payment of $165 million in ex-
ecutive bonuses received much criticism in March 2009, more troubling but
less discussed were the $40 billion in taxpayer funds that A.I.G. paid out
during the same period to settle its credit default swaps, mostly with large
U.S. and foreign banks and unregistered hedge funds."3 With A.I.G. still
holding more than $1.6 trillion in "notional derivatives exposure," there
have been estimates that taxpayers could face more than $300 billion in fur-
ther losses. Some analysts have called for putting A.I.G. into Chapter 11
bankruptcy to avoid the claims of derivative counterparties, while others
suggest that credit default swaps simply be declared unenforceable contracts
in which counterparties lack any insurable interest in the underlying
bonds. 114
There will likely be battles in the Obama administration and Congress
over issues like these. For example, those taking a more Bastard Keynesian,
"regulation-light" approach seek a central clearinghouse to help settle trans-
actions. Those who understand the necessity for an economics of control
"
2 HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM IklUMPHS IN THE
WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 57 (2000).
113 See Mary Williams Walsh, A.!.G. Lists Finns to Which It Paid Taxpayer Money, N.Y.
TIMES, March 16, 2009, at Al; Gretchen Morgenson, Covering Foreign Institutions Further
Upsets Some in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, March 18, 2009, at BI; Serena Ng, Hedge Funds May Get
AIG Cash, WALL ST. J., March 18, 2009, at Al.
114 See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Op-Ed., AIG Still Isn't Too Big to Fail, WALL ST. J., March
20, 2009, at A13 (arguing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy for AIG); Bert Ely, Bad Rules Produce
Bad Outcomes: Underlying Public Policy Causes of the U.S. Financial Crisis, 29 Cato J.,
13-14 (2009), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/journal/cj29n 1/cj29n 1-8.pdf (arguing that
credit default swaps be held unenforceable when the insured has no insurable interest in the
bonds being insured).
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seek a derivatives market exchange with the authority to impose capital and
margin requirements on these complex financial instruments." 5
There is some reason to believe an exchange will ultimately be adopted
for credit derivatives. At first glance, this would appear to be significant
because it would provide regulators with the authority to impose margin and
capital requirements, thereby limiting the leverage and growth in credit de-
fault swaps. However, non-standard derivatives-the so-called exotic deriv-
atives created by the largest financial institutions-would be exempt. As
Joe Nocera points out, it was these "customized, one-of-a-kind products that
generated enormous profits for institutions like A.I.G. that created them,
and, in the end, generated enormous damage to the financial system."" 6
Moreover, in the economics of uncontrolled and haphazard regulation,
policymakers always seem to be fighting yesterday's battles. Credit default
swaps, which have been so significant in the current crisis, may be less im-
portant to future stability than other derivatives. For example, there is a
danger that the nearly one trillion dollar fiscal stimulus package, along with
all of the liquidity the Federal Reserve is creating and pumping into the
financial system, could undermine confidence, push down the value of the
dollar, and/or push up U.S. interest rates and bond yields." 7 If so, this could
lead to trouble in other derivative markets, namely the markets for interest
rate derivatives and exchange rate derivatives. Unfortunately, since these
markets have thus far been relatively quiet compared with credit default
swaps, most of the regulatory attention has focused on credit derivatives
while ignoring these looming threats. This inability to anticipate and address
the various threats to the stability of our financial system results from the
failure to establish a coherent, coordinated approach to financial regulation.
There are other looming dangers to not returning to an economics of
control. Unregulated hedge funds now exceed one trillion dollars in equity.
Due to their high level of leverage, these hedge funds probably control tens
of trillions of dollars of other people's money. A failure in any large hedge
fund could have destabilizing ripple effects throughout the financial markets.
H5 George Soros, billionaire hedge fund manager, has voiced fears about the unregulated
market for credit default swaps. According to Soros, the prospect of cascading defaults hangs
over the financial system like a sword of Damocles. He did not initially call for outlawing the
market, but rather for its regulation by establishing a clearinghouse or exchange for the market,
capital requirements, and strict margin requirements for all existing and future credit default
swap contracts. Soros, supra note 87, at 15. However, more recently Soros has called for
banning credit default swaps. Soros Urges Ban on Credit default swaps, UPI.com, June 13,
2009, http://www.upi.comBusinessNews/2009/06/13/Soros-urges-ban-on-credit-default-
swapslUPI-20671244895874/ (quoting Soros as likening credit default swaps to "buying life
insurance on someone else's life and owning a license to kill him").
6 Joe Nocera, A Financial Overhaul Plan, But Only a Hint of Roosevelt, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/1/8business/18nocera.
html.
h7 For instance, when the Federal Reserve announced it would increase the size of its
balance sheet by another $1.15 trillion to about $3 trillion the news triggered a plunge in bond
yields and the dollar. Krishna Guha, Fed Purchase Plan Stuns Investors, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 19,
2009, at 1.
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The need to extend margin and capital requirements to hedge funds should
be apparent, but it is uncertain whether Congress and the president can mus-
ter the political will to impose regulation on such private centers of wealth,
privilege, and power, which cross national borders.
The world is very different today from what it was in the 1940s. The
financial marketplace is far more integrated and globalized. To protect the
stability of our own financial system, we must consider multilateral ways to
extend the economics of control beyond our borders, perhaps through finan-
cial transactions taxes on cross-border flows of currency and portfolio capi-
tal. l"8 The task will be challenging, but in many ways it is the unfinished
work of the Keynesian model and the Achilles heel of the system of global
finance that Keynes helped to create just before his death." 9
For Keynes and Lemer, central points of extending capital, margin, and
reserve requirements were to tame investors' incentives to gamble while
channeling credit and capital back into the public sector to be invested to
meet the long-term needs of society. It was through great public sector
projects that the foundations of a sustainable economy were to be achieved:
full employment, more equitable distributions of wealth and income, and the
maintenance of a truly free-enterprise competitive economic system.
Throughout the 1940s, when the Greatest Generation was not just win-
ning a world war but reconstructing war-torn continents and creating an
enormous middle class at home, the federal government spent and borrowed
more than twice as much as it does today, as a percentage of GDP. But in
the 1940s, the federal government borrowed at near-zero interest, and it bor-
rowed mostly from domestic, rather than foreign, sources. What made this
possible was a central bank that was strictly accountable to elected branches
and that imposed selective credit controls to prevent inflation in asset mar-
kets and limit systematic financial risk. Today, we are in need of the same
simple tools of regulation-speed bumps and traffic lights-to restore order
to our markets and provide the resources needed to rebuild our economy.
118 See generally Timothy A. Canova, Banking and Financial Reform at the Crossroads of
the Neoliberal Contagion, 14 Am. U. lwr'L L. REv. 1571, 1621 (1999); Canova, supra note
106, at 411-12.
119 See James R. Crotty, On Keynes and Capital Flight, 21 J. EcON. LITERATURE 59 (1983)
(analyzing Keynes' proposal for an International Clearing Union and capital controls to em-
power nations to achieve full employment and currency stability).
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